Sunday, December 27, 2009

Warisan Kuliner Masyarakat Muslim


Masyarakat Barat mengira makanan dan hidangan Muslim hanyalah kari, biryani, kebab, chapati, dan baklava. Dugaan itu ternyata salah besar. Dalam ajang konferensi internasional 1001 penemuan yang digelar di Museum Ilmu Pengetahuan dan IndustriManchester, dua tahun lalu, terungkap begitu banyak makanan dan masakan yang kini diklaim masyarakat Barat ternyata warisan dari umat Islam.
Di era keemasannya, umat Islam ternyata tak hanya melahirkan ilmu pengetahuan, teknologi, serta peradaban yang tinggi. Seni kuliner juga ternyata mendapat perhatian begitu besar dari para sarjana Muslim. Tak heran, jika beragam aneka resep masakan dan hidangan berkembang pada masa kejayaan. Hal itu dibuktikan dengan beragam kitab kuliner yang ditulis para sarjana Muslim.
Seni kuliner menempati posisi yang terbilang penting dalam sejarah peradaban Islam. Apalagi Rasulullah SAW menyuruh umatnya untuk memperhatikan kesehatan tubuh: ''Ina li-jasadika `alayka haqqan (Jasadmu memiliki hak atas dirimu),'' begitu sabda Nabi Muhammad SAW. Salah satu cara memelihara dan menjaga kesehatan tubuh adalah dengan menyantap makanan dan hidangan yang halal dan bergizi.
 
Berkembangnya seni kuliner pada masyarakat Muslim di era keemasan berawal dari Revolusi Pertanian. Pada masa itu, masyarakat Muslim Arab sudah mengembangkan beragam jenis sayur-sayuran dan buah-buahan yang sebelumnya tak dikenal. Tanaman sayuran dan buah-buahan itu lalu dikembangkan masyarakat Muslim di Mesir, Suriah, Afrika Utara, Spanyol, serta Sicilia.
Pengembangan seni kuliner di era keemasan tak dilakukan secara serampangan. Setiap hidangan dan resep yang diciptakan merupakan hasil dari penelitian dan didasarkan pertimbangan penata diet. Sebelum sebuah hidangan diperkenalkan kepada publik, para ahli kuliner Muslim meracik resep masakannya dengan penuh pertimbangan. Bumbu-bumbu masak yang digunakan pun merupakan hasil seleksi.
Sehingga hidangan yang diciptakan tak hanya lezat disantap, namun juga mengandung unsur-unsur pengobatan. Hidangan yang disajikan menjadi semacam obat yang dapat meningkatkan daya tahan tubuh dari penyakit serta mencegah penuaan dini. Untuk itu, para dokter Muslim berlomba untuk mencari dan meneliti rempah-rempah yang dapat dijadikan bumbu masak sekaligus berguna bagi kesehatan.
Dokter Muslim yang melakukan penelitian rempah-rempah yang berguna bagi kesehatan itu antara lain;
Thabit Ibnu Qurra (836 M - 901 M), melalui sederet risalah yang ditulisnya;
Abu Bakar Al-Razi (865 M - 925 M) dalam Al-Hawi fi't-tibb;
Ibnu Sina melalui Canon of Medicine;
Ibnu Sa'id al-Qurtubi (abad 10 M) dalam Kitab khalq al-janin wa tadbir al-hibala (diet untuk fetus dan ibu hamil); serta
Abu Marwan Ibnu Zuhr (1092 M - 1161 M) dalam buku tentang Nutrisi.
 
Hasil penelitian para dokter Muslim itu lalu diterapkan para koki terkemuka Muslim dalam meracik makanan dan hidangan yang dibuatnyaa. Di era keemasan, terdapat sederet buku tentang masak-memasak. Beberapa buku kuliner yang dihasilkan para koki Muslim itu antara lain;
Kanz al-fawa'id fi tanwi' al-maw'id yang ditulis seorang koki tak dikenal dari Mesir; Fadhalat al-khiwan fi atayyibat at-ta'am wa-'l-'alwan yang ditulis Ibnu Razin Attujibi pada abad ke-12 di Spanyol.
 
Selain itu ada pula :
Kitab At-tabikh fi al-Maghrib wa-'l-Andalus yang disusun seorang koki tak dikenal di Maroko pada abad ke-12 M;
Kitab At-tabikh yang ditulis Mohammed al-Baghdadi pada abad ke-13 M di Irak; Kitab At-Tabikh: ditulis Ibn Sayyar al-Warraqpada abad ke-13 M di Irak;
Tadhkira ditulis Dawad al-Antaki pada abad ke-13 M di Suriah;
Wasla 'l-habib fi wasf al-tayyibat wa-t-tibb ditulis Ibnu A'dim pada abad ke-13 M di Suriah.
 
Awalnya, resep-resep itu hanya beredar di kalangan istana. Setelah itu, barulah masyarakat biasa bisa meracik hidangan sesuai resep yang dibuat para koki andal itu. Saat itu, ilmu gizi telah dikembangkan sebagai salah satu bentuk pengobatan. Penguasa Muslim di era itu sudah memperkenalkan pentingnya menjaga kesehatan tubuh.
Di abad ke-13 M, buku-buku gizi beserta resep-resep masakan yang disusun para dokter Muslim menarik perhatian para penguasa, tak terkecuali Gereja di Barat pun ikut kepincut untuk mempelajarinya. Minat untuk mempelajari ilmu gizi beserta resep-resep makanan dan hidangannya semakin berkembang pesat ketika Ferrara , Salerno , Montpellier , dan Paris menjadi pusat untuk mempelajari ilmu kedokteran Islam.
Sejak itu, kalangan aristokrat dan penguasa di Eropa mulai mencicipi masakan dan bumbu masak yang diracik umat Islam. Meski begitu, penduduk biasa di Eropa Utara dibatasi untuk berdiet. Sedangkan, penduduk di Eropa Selatan sudah mulai menikmati hidup lebih baik dengan menyantap salad yang terdiri dari sayuran dan buah-buahan.
Salad dan sop juga merupakan hidangan yang diracik dan disarankan dokter Muslim seperi Al-Razi dan Ibnu Zohr. Selain itu, pasta juga ternyata warisan kuliner Islam. Petualang Muslim pada abad ke-11 M bernama Al-Bakri menuliskannya dalam catatan perjalanannya. Pada abad itu wanita-wanita Muslim sudah membuat pasta untuk jamuan makan.
Pasta warisan kuliner Muslim terbuat dari tepung terigu. Jenis tepung khusus diperkenalkan umat slam ke Sicilia dan Spanyol pada abad ke-10 M. Tak hanya itu, es krim juga merupakan warisan kuliner Muslim. Es krim dalam bahasa Italia disebut cassata yang berasal dari bahasa Arab Qashada (krim). Tempat penyimpanan es juga telah berkembang di masyarakat Islam. Namun, sejumlah dokter Muslim seperti Al-Razi dan Ibnu Sina tak menganjurkan meminum es dingin, karena bisa merusak syaraf.
Pola diet yang dikembangkan sarjana Muslim itu ternyata diterapkan Ratu Cristina selaku penguasa Denmark , Swedia, dan Norwegia. Sejak itu, seni kuliner juga berkembang pesat di Eropa. Masyarakat Barat ternyata tak hanya berutang pada ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi yang dikembangkan sarjana Muslim. Ternyata masakan dan resep yang dikembangkannya pun banyak meniru dan mengambil dari warisan kuliner Muslim.
 
Kopi, Minuman Asli Masyarakat Muslim
Menyeruput kopi telah menjadi gaya hidup masyarakat dunia modern. Tak heran, bila kemudian kedai kopi dari kelas bawah hingga kelas atas tumbuh dan menjamur. Minuman hitam yang nikmat itu ternyata juga ternyata warisan masyarakat Muslim di era keemasan.
Kali pertama, minuman kopi ditemukan masyarakat Muslim di Yaman pada abad ke-10 M. Di Yaman, kopi diracik sebagai minuman bernama Al-Qahwa. Konon, minuman itu dibuat oleh kelompok sufi agar mereka dapat tetap beribadah serta berzikir sepanjang malam. Kopi menyebar ke seluruh negeri Muslim melalui para pelancong, jamaah haji dan para pedagang.
 
Minuman kopi mulai dikenal masyarakat Makkah dan Turki di akhir abad ke-15 M. Sedangkan, masyarakat Mesir baru bisa mencicipi kopi pada abad ke-16 M. Masyarakat Eropa baru mengenal nikmatnya kpoi pada abad ke-17 M. Kopi masuk ke Eropa melalui Italia. Hubungan perdagangan antara Venisia dengan Afrika Utara, khususnya Mesir menjadi pintu masuknya kopi ke Eropa.
 
Awalnya, hanya kaum berpunya di Eropa yang bisa menyeruput nikmatnya kopi. Untuk pertama kalinya, kedai kopi dibuka di Venisia pada 1645 M. Sejak itu kopi menjadi minuman yang selalu hadir setiap sarapan masyarakat Venisia. Tak heran, jika pada 1763 telah berdiri 218 kedai kopi di wilayah itu.
 
Kedai kopi pertama muncul di Inggris pada 1650 M. Menurut Darby, kopi diperkenalkan melalui orang-orang Turki. Kopi dibawa ke Inggris oleh seorang saudagar Turki bernama Pasqua Rosee. Dia pertama kali menjual kopi di Lombard-Street. Pada 1658 M, Rosee juga membuka kedai kopi bernama Sultaness Head di Cornhill. Pada tahun 1700 M, di London sudah berdiri 500 kedai kopi.
 
Kopi mulai dikenal di Prancis pada 1644 M dibawa orang Marseilles yang kembali dari Istanbul Turki. Mereka tak hanya membawa kopi namun juga teknik meracik dan peralatan untuk membuat minuman kopi. Pertama kali, kedai kopi di buka di Marseilles pada tahun 1671 M. Setelah hadir di Italia, Inggris dan Prancis, kopi lalu menyebar ke seluruh benuah Eropa.
 
Masyarakat Jerman mulai mengenal kopi setelah mengalangkah pasukan Turki. Sedangkan, Belanda membawa biji kopi dari negara Muslim di Asia Tenggara, yakni Indonesia . Masyarakat Amerika justru terbilang paling belakang mengenal dan merasakan nikmatnya kopi. Kopi di bawa ke Amerika melalui orang Prancis.
Sejak 1683 M, cara baru mempersiapkan dan meminum baru mulai ditemukan. Minuman kopi pun mulai bervariasi. Masyarakat dunia pun mengenal Cappuccino. Konon, nama Cappucino diambil dari nama biarawan Capuchin yang melawan Turki dalam pertempuran di Winna pada 1683 M.
 
Minuman Ringan Pertama di Dunia
Bisnis minuman ringan alias soft drink kini begitu menggurita. Sebagian besar binis minuman ringan ternyata dikuasai perusahan Eropa dan Amerika. Ternyata soft drink berawal dan berakar dari komunitas masyarakat Islam di era kejayaan. Minuman ringan yang pertama kali dikembangkan di dunia bernama Sherbet.
Minuman ringan yang populer di dunia Islam itu terbuat dari jus atau ekstrak bunga atau rempah-rempah dan ditambah gula serta air. Bentuknya mirip sirup dan diminum dengan ditambahi es. Sherbet begitu populer hingga awal abad ke-20 M. Pada era itu, masyarakat dunia kesulitan untuk mendapatkan buah-buahan segar.
Sherbet berasal dari bahasa Arab shariba atau meminum. Konon, kata syrup juga berasal dari sherbet. Masyarakat Turki Usmani menyeruput sherbet sebelum dan ketika makan. Di Turki, sherbet disajikan dengan beragam makanan khas Ottoman. Selain masyarakat Muslim Turki, orang Mesir juga memiliki kebiasaan meminum sharaab atau sherbet. Orang Mesir memiliki beragam jenis sherbet atau minuman manis.

( heri ruslan )

Monday, December 21, 2009

An Examination of the Punishment on Riddah In A Democratic Setting


An Examination of the Punishment on Riddah In A Democratic Setting: NIGERIA AS A CASE STUDY

Introduction
The introduction and implementation of the sharicah in some parts of Northern Nigeria in 1999, starting with Zamfara State has reopened the debate on the practicability of the hudud (capital punishment) in a democratic setting. Its adoption or restoration, as Yadudu puts it, has survived the orders from Abuja for “a reversion to status-quo.” A new challenge has therefore emerged. The application of the hudud, especially the punishments on As-sariqah (theft) and Az-zinah (illicit sexual affairs), has generated national and international discourse. Convicts of the two crimes have been brought to book in many sharicah compliant States. The case of Ridda (apostasy) is yet to receive such attention despite the assumption of the death penalty placed on it through ijtihad of Islamic Jurists. Similar;y it is discovered that the punishment on apostasy is deliberately omitted in the penal code law of the States that expanded the application of the sharicah. Such omission perhaps, is due to its clash with a constitutional provision of freedom of thought and religion.
This paper investigates the punishment on irtidad or Riddah in the Qur’an and hadith and upholds the assertion that the capital punishment on apostasy is not adequately sustained in the Qur’an. Similarly the sunnah gives insight into the death penalty for apostates, yet the Prophet himself did not put those who denounced their faith in his life time to death. This truism, if viewed objectively as argued in this paper, nay lead to an entire different conclusion on Riddah and will serve as a point of reference by the States that expanded the application of the sharicah.
Definition of Term
The Arabic word for apostasy is riddah or irtidad its verb is radd, which among other connotations has the meaning “to retreat, to retire to withdraw from or fall back from.”2  El-Awa draws a line of demarcation between irtidad and riddah as follows:
The former (riddah) is usually used to signify turning back from Islam to another religion or to unbelief, while the latter (irtidad) has this meaning in addition to others: a person who forsakes Islam for unbelief or for another religion is called murtadd, i.e. apostate.3
This explanation, in our view, is mere theoretical. A fact worth admitting, however, is that riddah (in theory or practice) is peculiar only to the Islamic faith. Thus, a murtadd, according to jurists, is a person who denounces the Islamic faith. Should a non-Muslim denounce his faith and embrace Islam, he is not considered a murtadd. Sayyid Sabiq provides a comprehensive analysis of the jurists’ opinion on this point. He explains:
If a Muslim denounces Islam, he has apostatized ... (but), if a non-Muslim abandons his faith and embraces another un-Islamic faith, he should be regarded as a member of his new embraced faith and should not be disputed over it (or considered an apostate). This is because he abandons a wrong religion and embraces another in the negative direction. And for sure, atheism is one in all its ramifications.4

It is worth mentioning in passing that the subject of riddah is completely unknown to western writers, those who write about it only explain Muslim points of view.5 It is therefore clear that the western scholar’s approach to riddah is not an in-depth study of the primary sources of the shari’ah, but a reproduction of the fiqh scholars’ position, out of which the following assumption is derived.
Both jurists and theologians agree that apostasy constitutes a violation of law, punishable both in this world and the next. Not only is the person denied salvation in the next world but heie is liable to capital punishment by the state.6

The image of Islam created by the above conclusion of a writer, should encourage Muslim intellectuals to delve into the real Qur’anic teachings on apostasy as well as the Prophetic position on it. The sample opinion gathered in this respect is that such legislation is not traceable to the Qur’an. It is also discovered that the sunnah is not categorical on the issue, which casts doubt on the one-sided conclusion of the death penalty, as argued in this paper; meanwhile, the connotative meaning of hudud is presented below:
The Arabic word hudud (s. hadd) has many connotations. It has been suggested that the limit of something is its hadd. In this respect, it is the transgression of the limit of Allah that attracts stipulated punishments (hudud).
It should be observed that penal law is not solely restricted to Islam. Each worldview or system of life has its corresponding sanctions against particular sins or crimes; except the case of riddah, which, as earlier observed, is peculiar to Islam. Such punishments are not only to serve as corrective measures but also deterrence as well. The hudud is not only based on social utility but it is principally normative based on the divine revelations as contained in the Qur’an and the sunnah.
Legislation, in this regard, as Mawdudi observes, is to be carried out within the limits prescribed by the law of the sharicah 7 It is pertinent to note that the basis of the sharicah is not restricted to the Qur’an and the hadith. Islamic law allows a group of jurists to interpret and evolve new regulations for modern necessities which, because of their newness and circumstances, are not expressly stated in the Qur’an and hadith.8 The sharicah, therefore, is dynamic. It covers, among others, cibadat (worship), mucamalat (social transactions), Qisas/Diyah (retaliatory compensations), ta’zir (discretionary punishment) and hudud (fixed punishments).9
The respect which the sharicah accords to human beings through the recognition of human rights is demonstrated in its terms of reference. It starts from the recognition of the fact that every man, whether he professes the Islamic faith or not, has certain basic rights simply because he is a human being. Mawdudi has painstakingly summarized the basic rights of citizens in an Islamic state irrespective of his or her religious persuasion. Such rights include security of life and property, freedom of expression and protection of religious inclination. This unique position of the sharicah on the rights of non-Muslims in an Islamic State has led to various treatises by the jurists. The first basic human right which must be observed and respected in all circtmtstances is the protection of human blood, which is regarded as sacred and may not be spilled without strong justification.11 It could therefore be rightly observed that the sharicah respects freedom of expression, freedom of conscience and guarantees non-Muslims’ religious inclinations. It also protects a Muslim is not allowed to denounce his faith due to the constitutional provision of freedom of religious persuasion. This is regarded as capital offence of which the death penalty is alleged to have been placed. In this context the teachings of the principal sources of the’ sharicah, i.e. the Qur’an, sunnah and ijma’u on riddah (apostasy) is examined in the next section.
Apostasy in the Qur’an and Sunnah
The word riddah or irtidad is mentioned in the Qur’an in thirteen verses as a grave sin, but none of these verses recommends capital punishment. It suffices to quote one of them here.
And whosoever of you turns back from his religion and dies as a disbeliever, then his deeds will be lost in this life and in the Hereafter and they will be dwellers of the fire. They will abide therein forever (2:217).

The above verse, as far as we know, removes any doubt as to the exact teaching of the Qur’an on apostasy. It only contains an assurance that the apostate will be punished in the hereafter and there is nothing to suggest any capital punishment in this world. It is further argued that:
None of the Qur’anic verses that allude to death as punishment for apostasy addresses itself to apostasy simpliciter but apostasy combined with political subversion and treachery.12

El-Awa investigates this verse alongside Q2:256, which proclaims “No compulsion in religion,” and concludes that:
One can say that the death penalty for apostasy, especially when it is considered as hadd punishment, contradicts the Qur’anic principle law states in Surah 2:256, which proclaims “No compulsion in religion.”13

Though El-Awa’s argument in this submission is seen to be accurate, but a blanket approval of this position could lead to a license for Muslims to apostatize at will. Ibn Kathir’s suggestion that the verse is on coercing and compelling non-Muslims to accept Islam against their wishes is very attractive to us.14 This submission, to the best of our knowledge, is strong enough to invalidate Ibn Hazm’s apologetic position that the phrase “No compulsion in religion is abrogated, and that compulsion is allowed in religion.15
The protagonists of death penalty on apostasy rely- on some ahadith to support their position. Two hadiths are prominent in this regard:
cAbdullah Ibn Mascud reported Allah’s messenger (peace and blessings of Allah he upon him) as saying: It is not permissible to take the life of a Muslim who bears testimony to the fact that there is no god but Allah and I am the messenger of Allah, but on one of the (following) three cases: a life for life, the married adulterer and deserter of his Din, abandoning the community.16
The relevant portion on irtidad from this hadith is the phrase “deserter of his Din, abandoning his community.” A critical analysis of this statement, in our view, may lead to an entirely different conclusion. The Prophet’s position is very instructive. The deserter of his Din is combined with another major offence, the abandoning of the community. This could be interpreted to mean a rebellious move against the State. Thus, if turning away from the Din is not accompanied with a rebellious threat to the constituted authority, it could be regarded as a harmless apostasy.
Another hadith which favours death penalty on apostasy- reads: “Whoever that changes his religion, kill him.”17 This phrase could be interpreted in many ways. Should a non-Muslim who converted to Islam be killed as well? This would not be in line with the restrictions placed on the connotative meanings of riddah as earlier observed. On this note, it is logical to argue that the phrase “kill him” probably belongs to the category of the abrogated traditions. The Prophet, it must be admitted, did not put any apostate to death despite the fact that traces of apostasy were noted during his life time as could be understood from the following narration:
A bedouin Arab came to the Prophet and accepted Islam, then fever over took him while he was still at al-Madinah, so he went to the Prophet and said, give me back my pledge but the Prophet refused. The Arab did the same on the second and third day and the Prophet refused. The man afterwards left al-Madinah unharmed.18
This position however is different from apostasy combined with other crimes of which death sentence was pronounced by the Prophet. Among such cases was that of Miqyas Ibn Hibahbah and Ibn  Hatal both of whom separately denounced their faith, killed some Muslims and confiscated their properties. Similarly Ibn Abi Sarh was ordered to be killed when he combined apostasy with a plot to eliminate the Prophet.19 Reference could also be made of the case of cUkal and cUrayan. In a long tradition reported by Bukhari.20 It is reported, that some people from the two tribes went to the Prophet to embrace Islam. The climate of Madinah did not suit them and (they) subsequently felt ill. The Prophet advised them to go to the place where the camels were grazing and to drink from their milk and urine (as a medicine). After their recovery, they reverted from Islam and killed the shepherd and took away the camels. The Prophet sent some people in their pursuit and they were captured. Then he punished them gouging out their eyes, cutting their hands and legs till they died, exactly as they had done to the camels’ guard.
One spectacular feature in all the cases cited above is the fact that apostasy was combined with manslaughter, another capital offence. The only exception is the case of Ibn Abi Sarh who plotted to eliminate the Prophet. His offence could be described as a treasonable felony, which attracts capital punishment even in the modern time. Ibn Taymiyyah is therefore correct in his submission that an apostate simpliciter is to be asked to seek forgiveness from Allah, while apostasy combined with other criminal offences attracts capital punishment.
Juridicial Views on Apostasy
The genuine concern of the Islamic jurists is to protect the State from rebellious moves, as Sabiq observes. This has led to the imposition of death penalty on apostasy, be it simpliciter or combined with rebellious move.21 Their conclusion, as far as we know, is drawn from the fact that the first caliph Abubakr is reported to have imposed war on those that denounced their faith and refused to pay zakkah dues22 which constituted a rebellious move against the State. Rahman has lamented this position as follows:

Unfortunately, our fiqh compendiums do not enter on analytical study of this problem, in the light of Qur’an injunctions and authentic sunnah and no distinction apparently exists in the minds of the old jurists between apostasy simpliciter and apostasy combined with treason or severance of allegiance to the state.23
It is worth mentioning here that some modern scholars consider the issue of riddah, be it simple or combined with other crimes, an offence punishable by ta’zir (discretion) and not hadd. Qardawi, quoting from different sources narrates that Umar Ibn Al-Khattab favoured imprisonment of the apostates who joined the force of the non-Muslims, fighting against the Islamic State during his time. He argues, rather, that Umar did not consider death sentence the best option in every circumstances as the apostates joined the non-Muslim army for safety.24
The position of ‘Umar, in our view, is not against the decision of the Prophet on apostasy combined with rebellious moves as earlier referred. ‘Umar is seen here to have understood the punishment on riddah as a case of discretionary punishment (ta’zir). From these analyses, it could therefore rightly be observed that:
i.      Apostasy that is combined with rebellious move attracts capital punishment, while simple apostasy is assured of punishment in the hereafter.
ii.     The Prophet did not put any apostate to death, despite the fact that traces of apostasy were noted during his time.
iii.    Apostasy could be classified as an offence punishable by ta’zir.
Riddah and the Nigerian Constitution
The application of hudud in Nigeria pre-dates the Independence. The British Colonialists, for example, insisted on its abrogation in the justice system of Northern Nigeria as one of the conditions for Independence in 1960.25 Its application in this respect was considered by the colonialists as repugnant to natural justice. This argument has remained an established thesis by the opposition to the implementation of the hudud.
Thus, the debate on whether the concept of federalism as entrenched in the Nigerian constitution favours the adoption of the hudud attracts divergent views. Those who oppose its adoption argue that section 277 of the Constitution limits the application of the Islamic law to Personal matters, while section 10 of the Constitution prohibits any State from adopting any religion as a State religion.26 It is further argued that article 1.3 states that: “If any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution, this constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.”
The supporters of sharicah also take cover in the same Constitution to justify the adoption of the sharicah in some States of the Federation. Yadudu, for example, has been promoting the application of the hudud based on certain constitutional provisions. He explains:
firstly, section 38 of the 1999 constitution guarantees freedom of religion... secondly, it is not in doubt that states do have legislative competence under among others section 4,6.277 and the second schedule to the 1999 constitution to establish sharicah courts in addition to existing ones, expand their jurisdiction and enact laws drawing inspiration from religious and non-religious norms.27

As much as this writer believes in the multi-religious nature of Nigeria and in the Islamic principle of “no compulsion in religious matters,” the clarifications by Muhammad Bello, a retired Chief Justice of Nigeria, on the constitutionality of the application of the hudud is, however, very attractive:
When the clamour for the sharicah began ... some people rushed to the opinion that a state government lacks the constitutional power to enact Sharicah laws in their territory... Section 4 of the constitution has divided the legislative powers of government between the Federation and states. In its second schedule, it specifies the exclusive legislative list on which only the Federation may make laws, and also the concurrent legislative list, on which both the federation and the State may make laws. In addition, it empowers the States to make laws on any other matter not included in the two lists. Sharicah falls within the residue and consequently, a state has the constitutional power to make laws relating to the Sharicah.28

The clarifications by Muhammad Bello notwithstanding, the States that adopt the hudud are seen to be silent on the issue of riddah. The Sharicah penal code law of Zamfara state which was assented by the Governor of the State, Alha.ji Ahmad Sanni on 27th day of January, 1999, for example, is silent on the punishment for apostasy. This deliberate omission of the punishment on riddah, is not unconnected with the constitutional provision as contained in section 38 (1) which clearly states as follows:
Every Person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and Religion, including freedom to change his Religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in a community with others, and in public or in private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
This provision, coupled with the general assumption that capital punishment is placed on apostasy, prevents all the States that adopt the hudud to have a clear-cut law on Apostasy. Ahmed Bello Mahamud, the Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice in Zamfara State, admits that apostasy is one of the problems that the Zamfara initiative on the sharicah issue encountered. He notes:
S.38 (1) of the constitution was to clash with the offence of apostasy in Islam. We were to choose between including the offence in our penal system at the risk of inviting a myriad of court litigations, injunctions and counter-injunctions, contempt proceedings and avoiding this suicidal plunge as a strategy so that we could live long to see the fruits of our ingenious efforts on the shari’ah project. We chose the latter way out as we pray for God’s guidance through the right path.29
The acceptance of the superiority of the Constitution, as implied by the Zamfara initiative, may not go well with the mainstream position of some legal experts. The non – inclusion of the provision of riddah in the Penal code law implies that a Muslim who denounces his faith in any of the states that adopts the hudud cannot be brought to book. The constitution protects him in this regard. This offence, to the bset of our knowledge, can still be accommodated in the penal sytem of the States that adopts the hudud. The classificiation of riddah into two, with their corresponding punishment would enure that the hudud is not suppressed for the man-made laws. Thus, an apostate simjpliciter whose act is not regarded as capital offence as argued in this paper, could still be in line with the demands of S.38(1) of the Constitution while a rebellious move against the provision of the hudud could be regarded as a treasonable felony which constitutes capital offence to any modern day government.
Conclusion
The rise of sharicah (hudud) advocacy and implementation in some States in the Northern Nigeria has re-opened a new ground for self-determination and cultural identity to the Muslims in the era of globalization and Islamic revivalism. The adoption of the hudud is a practical move to provide an alternative to the imposition of western constitution since the Amalgamation of 1914. The implementation of the hudud has, however, attracted diverse comments. The human rights groups are in the forefront in its condemnation because of the enforcement of the prescribed punishment on the cases of zina (fornication) and As-sarqah (theft). As for apostasy, unlike theft and fornication, which have attracted the attention of the States that expanded the Sharicah, no one has been charged for the offence yet and the penal laws of such States are silent on it. This paper therefore brings to focus the divergent views on riddah with a view to guide the States that adopt the hudud. The fact that apostasy is a criminal crime in the face of the sharicah is sustained in this paper. We therefore suggest that lawmakers and Muslim intellectuals in the States that adopt hudud should fashion out appropriate punishment for apostate simpliciter, which, as argued in this paper, is different from a rebellious apostasy of which death sentence is imposed.


Notes And References
1.      A.H. Yadudu, “Benefits of Shariah and Challenges of Reclaiming A Heritage”, London, paper presentation at Commonwealth Institute, Kensington High Street, 2001, p. 1.
2.      S.A. Rahman, Punishment of Apostasy in Islam, New Delhi-2: Kitab Bharan, 1996, p. 9.
3.      M.S. El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law: A Comparative Study, Indianapolis: American Trust Publication, 1998, pp. 49-50.
4.      Sayyid Sabiq, Fiqhus-Sunnah, Cairo: Maktabah Dar Ath-thurath, n.d., 3(2), p. 382.
5.      M.S. El-Awa, op. cit., p. 43.
6.      S.A. Rahman, op. cit., p. 4.
7.      A.A. Mawdudi, Human Rights in Islam, London: The Islamic Foundation, 1976, p. 13.
8.      I.O. Oloyede, Shari’ah versus Secularism in Nigeria, Lagos: Islamic Publications Bureau, 1985, p. 9.
9.      Ibid.
10.     A.A. Mawdudi, op. cit., p. 23.
11.     A.A. Mawdudi, Islamic Law and Constitution, New Delhi: Taj Company, 1986, pp. 273-300.
12.     Oloyede, op. cit., p. 49.
13.     El-Awa, op. cit., p. 51.
14.     A.I. Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Kathir, Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1999, 4(1), p. 354.
15.     El-Awa, op. cit., p. 51.
16.     M.O.A. Abdul, The Prophet of Islam, Lagos: Islamic Publications Bureau, 1986, p. 85.
17.     Sabiq, op. cit., 3(2), p. 386.
18.     M.I. Al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, ‘Abdulhamid Siddiq (trans.), Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, n.d., 9(9), pp. 10-11.
19.     Y. Al-Qardawi, Jaramah al-Riddah wa ‘Quubah al-Murtad, Egypt: Maktabah al-Wahabah, 1996, p. 49.
20.     Al-Bukhari, op. cit., 9(8), pp. 519-520.
21.     Sabiq, op. cit., 3(2), p. 386.
22.     M.Y. Al-Kadahali, Hayatus-Sahabah, Cairo: Dar al-Hadith, 1997.
23.     Rahman, op. cit., p. 3.
24.     Al-Qardawi, op. cit., p. 51.
25.     I. Sulaiman, “Shari’ah Restoration in Nigeria: The Dynamics and the Process,” a paper presented at the International Conference on the Restoration of Shari’ah in Nigeria, London: 2001, p. 4.
26.     M. Tabiu, “Shari’ah, Federalism and Nigerian Constitution,” a paper presented at the International Conference on the Restoration of Shari’ah in Nigeria, London, 2001, p. 9.
27.     A. H. Yadudu, op. cit., p. 8.
28.     A.A. Mahamad, “Sharia and Democracy: The Zamfara State Experience,” in Al-Maslaha – Journal of Law and Religion, 2003, vol. 2, p. 46.


Tuesday, December 08, 2009

Severe Broken Judicial System in Indonesia

  One of the world's most corrupt country, even in legal system!  No justice overthere!.

 Trapped Inside a Broken Judicial System After Hitting Send

Ed Wray for The New York Times
“People always lose to the powerful in this country. I’m a mother, a regular person like everybody else, so a lot of people identified with me and felt sympathy.” PRITA MULYASARI

Published: December 4, 2009
TANGERANG, Indonesia
PRITA MULYASARI became famous, as her lawyer put it, for going from “e-mail to jail.”
Her ordeal began when she sent an e-mail message complaining about the poor treatment she received at a hospital to 20 relatives, friends and co-workers. The message, forwarded from one mailing list to another, eventually fell into the hands of the hospital’s lawyers, who sued for defamation. In no time, Ms. Mulyasari, 32, a mother of two infants, found herself sharing a jail cell with murderers and facing six years in prison, seemingly yet another ordinary Indonesian caught up in one of the world’s most corrupt legal systems.
And yet Ms. Mulyasari’s story didn’t end there. After word of her predicament leaked out, support for her swelled in Indonesia’s freewheeling news media and blogosphere, forcing the authorities to release her after three weeks in jail.
“People always lose to the powerful in this country,” Mrs. Mulyasari said. “I’m a mother, a regular person like everybody else, so a lot of people identified with me and felt sympathy.”
Being a symbol made her visibly uncomfortable, though, as she posed for photographs for supporters at a court hearing this week here in Tangerang, a city near the capital, Jakarta. A ruling in her trial is expected later this month, and Mrs. Mulyasari said she was hoping that a not-guilty verdict would allow her to slip back into anonymity. Prosecutors are seeking a six-month sentence.
Whatever the judgment, it will be scrutinized because of an unrelated, continuing scandal involving the national police, attorney general’s office and anticorruption agency. Recent revelations have put a spotlight on a judicial netherworld where the rich routinely bribe corrupt police officials, prosecutors and judges for favorable treatment.
Meanwhile, ordinary people appear subject to severe punishment for seemingly harmless infractions. Last month, an illiterate grandmother in Central Java was convicted of stealing cacao fruits worth 15 cents, which she took by mistake, from a plantation company and handed a suspended sentence of 45 days. A Jakarta man arrested for charging his cellphone in a hallway inside his building is now on trial for theft.
As for Ms. Mulyasari, she said she had lost faith in the country’s legal system.
“My only hope is to pray and to appeal to the judge’s humanity,” she said, a few minutes before her hearing began.
On this morning, as they had done for every court hearing in recent months, Ms. Mulyasari and her husband, Andri Nugroho, 30, took a day off from work and left their two children at home. It was her lawyers’ turn to argue that Ms. Mulyasari had had no intention of forwarding her e-mail message beyond the original recipients.
In a courtroom with no air-conditioning, where many fanned themselves with sheets of paper, her lawyers took turns reading from a 178-page brief. Ms. Mulyasari, who did not speak, sat by herself in a chair facing three judges on an elevated bench. Only the white hijab covering her head was visible from the gallery.
It all began one night 16 months ago when Ms. Mulyasari went to the Omni International Hospital here with a high fever, a few months after the birth of her second child. She had driven by the hospital many times before and had been drawn by the word “international” on the modern building’s facade. “You think the service must be good, that the standards are international,” she said during breaks in the hearing.
ACCORDING to Mrs. Mulyasari’s account, she was diagnosed with dengue fever, an infectious disease transmitted by mosquitoes that is common here, and began receiving injections. But her condition kept getting worse. As her neck, left hand and left eye swelled, she had trouble breathing. After six days at Omni, she transferred herself to another hospital, which immediately diagnosed her with mumps and treated her.
Angry about her treatment at Omni and what she described as the staff’s unresponsiveness, she composed the long e-mail message detailing her experience there, criticizing physicians and others by name. Then, using her Yahoo account, she fired it off to her circle of family, friends and colleagues at the bank where she works in customer service. “I don’t want to know who forwarded it,” she said, “because they’re all family and friends.”
The message flitted from one address to another, bouncing onto a Yahoo mailing list of Indonesian physicians, before being picked up by Omni.
The hospital’s lawyers filed a civil lawsuit, eventually winning $21,600 in damages, a ruling that Ms. Mulyasari’s chief lawyer, Slamet Yuwono, is planning to appeal. What’s more, acting on the hospital’s complaints, prosecutors at first pursued criminal charges of defamation, which carries a maximum four-year prison sentence. Lawyers for Omni did not return phone calls requesting comment.